Note: I’m on quasi-vacation for the rest of the month. This series will consist mostly of excerpts from published articles.

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Russia’s hybrid war against the West, by Arsalan Bilal. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2024/04/26/russias-hybrid-war-against-the-west/index.html

The disappearance of the buffer that existed between NATO and the Soviet heartland during the Cold War has instilled a new sense of vulnerability in the Russian national security establishment.Moscow sees itself fighting a long war against what it deems a Western hegemony.

It is in this context that Russian President Putin terms “Western elite” the enemy. What exactly he means by Western elite is kept ambiguous, perhaps for political expediency, but his ultimate nemeses are clearly the US and European powers who lead the global political and economic order.

Moscow’s hostility towards the West is just the tip of the iceberg. In terms of a grand strategy, Moscow, under President Putin’s leadership, desires a return to the power balance of the past wherein the Soviet Union was a superpower and could thus define the rules of the international order on a global level.

But Moscow realises that it structurally cannot find much space in the international political order, which places a premium on values like freedom and democracy – ideals that are extremely limited in Russia. So the international order ought to be redefined in a bid to (re-)establish Russia’s ascendency over global politics and economy.

This is apparent within the Primakov Doctrine – so-called for former Foreign and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. The Doctrine posits that Russia should aim to establish a multipolar world so that the global order cannot be defined by a single power or pole. It is for this reason that Moscow aims to undercut what it views as Western power and Western influence around the world

The idea is two-fold: enhancing Russia’s power capabilities through an integration of military and non-military means, and exploiting and exacerbating the internal vulnerability of Western powers.

The goal is clear: truncate power asymmetry between Russia and Western powers in order to triumph over them.

Hybrid warfare seems to have become an integral part of Moscow’s policy vis-à-vis the West.

One of the core facets of the common tools that states conflate to unleash hybrid warfare, such as non-state actors, political assassinations, espionage, cyber-attacks, electoral interference, and disinformation, is that there is ample room for plausible deniability – and there is often little evidence to establish culpability.

Meanwhile, new technologies allow states to use force from a distance and deny involvement. Drone strikes and attacks on critical infrastructure are good examples of this.

Moscow [also seeks] to constrain the United States with the help of other major powers and to position itself as an indispensable actor with a vote and a veto, whose consent is necessary to settle any key issue facing the international community.

In a strong, new warning to the West, President Vladimir Putin said [in April 2024] that any nation’s conventional attack on Russia that is supported by a nuclear power will be considered a joint attack on his country… an attack against his country by a nonnuclear power with the “participation or support of a nuclear power” will be seen as their “joint attack on the Russian Federation.”

The change in the doctrine follows Putin’s warning to the U.S. and other NATO allies that allowing Ukraine to use Western-supplied longer-range weapons to hit Russian territory would mean that Russia and NATO are at war. Ukraine has repeatedly struck Russian territory with missiles and drones in response to Moscow's attacks. (My italics)

The new phrasing holds the door open to a potential nuclear response to any aerial attack -- a deliberate ambiguity intended to make the West more reluctant to allow longer-range strikes.