I just read Strange Bedfellows: The Alliance Theory of Political Belief Systems by David Pinsof, David Sears and Martie Haselton. My reaction: They’re so right! Of course! How could I have missed it? Now I’m going to have to rethink my whole approach to morality, ideology, and the nature of beliefs. That’s going to take a while, but in the meantime here are some excerpts* from Strange Bedfellows:

Political belief systems in the United States can be confusing. According to public opinion polls, conservatives believe:  

…that we ought to have more respect for authority (but business owners should disobey regulations they believe are unfair); 

…that people should be allowed to express their political opinions freely in the workplace (but athletes should not be allowed to kneel during the national anthem); 

…that nobody deserves a free handout from the government (but the government should do more to help small, working class towns in America’s heartland); and 

…that we ought to be more suspicious of foreigners (but we should trust Vladimir Putin when he said that he did not interfere in the 2016 election).  

On the other hand, liberals believe: 

…that it’s unfair for CEOs to make millions of dollars a year (but it’s fair for Hollywood movie stars to make millions of dollars a year); 

…that we should stand in solidarity with labor unions (but not police unions); 

…that we should not blame all Muslims for Islamist terrorist attacks (but we should blame all Trump voters for the 2017 killing in Charlottesville); and  

…that it’s wrong to endorse negative stereotypes about a group of people based on their place of birth (but people from the south are racist). 

What is the moral thread that ties all these beliefs together? We suggest a novel answer: there is none. Each moral standard [described above], together with its apparent violation, serves a strategic function, namely mobilizing support for a specific political ally, or mobilizing opposition to a specific political rival. The more heterogeneous one’s allies and rivals, the more heterogeneous one’s political beliefs will be. 

Indeed, we argue that political belief systems are not so much “philosophies” as collections of ad hoc justifications, rationalizations, moralizations, embellishments, and rhetorical tactics designed to advance the interests of complex political alliances in competition with their rivals.  

Moral principles are not so principled. Core values are not so core. Ideological worldviews are not designed to literally view the world but to serve strategic functions like signaling allegiance or mobilizing support. 

What explains the contents of political belief systems? A widespread view is that they derive from abstract values, like equality, tolerance, and authority.  

Here, we challenge this view, arguing instead that belief systems derive from political alliance structures that vary across nations and time periods. When partisans mobilize support for their political allies, they generate patchwork narratives that appeal to ad-hoc, and often incompatible, moral principles. 

To be sure, there may be broader ideological or partisan identities that encompass these phenomena. But to focus on these broader identities is to lose sight of the key explanatory factors of political belief systems.

People do not simply cheer for ideologies or parties as monolithic entities: they advocate for, and rally opposition to, a variety of distinct ethnic, religious, economic, occupational, and cultural groups (in addition to specific individuals) situated in unique conflicts.  

It is these conflicts that explain political belief systems, defining—and continually redefining—what it means to be a liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat.

—

* I changed the format and some punctuation for readability.

Reference:

Pinsof, D., Sears, D. O., & Haselton, M. G. (2023). Strange Bedfellows: The Alliance Theory of Political Belief Systems. Psychological Inquiry, 34(3), 139–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2023.2274433